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1. Toward a Polyphonic View of Cultural Identity 
In this paper I will use the Bakhtinian notion of polyphony, 1 
of a choral dialogue of multiple and heterogeneous voices, to 
elaborate a pluralistic account of cultural identity in general and 
of Hispanic identity in particular. I will complicate and further 
pluralize the Bakhtinian notion by talking about the overlapping 
and criss-crossing dialogues of heterogeneous voices that go 
into the formation of cultural identities. My pluralistic view 
emphasizes that cultural identity is bound up with differences 
and opposes those homogeneous models that try to irnpose a 
unique articulation of collective identity on the members of a 
group. Although I will not explicitly discuss the cornplex relations 
between cultural identity and racial and ethnic identity/ my 
pluralistic view underscores that racial and ethnic elements are 
crucial components of cultural identity and of its heterogeneous 
nature; and I oppose those contemporary views that talk about 
"post-ethnic" and "post-racial" identities, trying to purify individual 
and collective identities of racial and ethnic meanings.' 
Cultural differences are everywhere. l11ere is no way around 
this omnipresent cultural heterogeneity in the 21st century. It has 
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become clear that the globalized world of today is a pluri-verse, 
rather than a uni-verse, and that multiculturalism is not simply 
the exotic peculiarity of some post-colonial societies, but the 
inescapable predicament of the contemporary world commu nity. 
But even multicultural views of today's world and its communities 
are often not pluralistic enough because they frequently assume 
a homogeneous view of the participating cultural identities, as 
if each of them had a unique voice and could make only one 
unique contribution to the multicultural dialogue. It will be my 
contention that not only multicultural societies are polyphonic, 
but each cultural group (no matter how homogeneous it may 
appear to be) contains a plurality of voices. Cultures speak in 
many voices.4 They are heterogeneous through and through. 
Differences and heterogeneity go all the way down to the very 
core of a cultural identity. So we need an account that can make 
sense of identity through differences, not in spite of them. 
Through the notion of polyphony I will try to articulate 
a pluralistic perspective that can shed light on how cultural 
identities are formed, sustained, and transformed, as well as on 
how they interact with one another in cross-cultu ral dialogues. 
A philosophical elucidation of polyphonic dialogues within 
and across cultures is now needed more than ever. For cultural 
differences have come under suspicion and the appreciation of 
their positive significance has become a difficult challenge. The 
radical pluralism I articulate and defend in this paper highlights 
the positive contributions of cultural diversity and the dangers 
of trying to repress it, tame it, constrain it, or make it fit in fixed 
molds and restricted spaces. As it will become clear in the last 
section when I apply my pluralistic approach to situated Hispanic 
identities in particular cultural contexts, the goal of my polyphonic 
view is to facilitate playful and diverse forms of identification 
and to open up sites for disidentification,5 calling attention to 
alternative cultural spaces in which different (non-conforming) 
identities-distanced from mainstream culture--can flourish. 
In the next section I will articulate my pluralistic view by 
elaborating central insights that I draw from Wittgenstein's 
philosophy of language and philosophy of culture. 1 will further 
develop my polyphonic pluralism in the third and final section by 
elu�idating the linguistic and cultural practices of Hispanics in 
particularly challenging contexts: Chicanos living by the Mexico-
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USA border, en Ia frontera; and marginal ized groups l iving in  
urban ghettos in  Mexico City. 
2. Wittgenstein and the Hispanic family 
In this section I try to determine what the contemporary 
phi losophical debate about Hispanic identity can learn from the 
historical, practical, and normative contextual ism that informs 
Wittgenstei n's later phi losophy. I argue that from Wittgenstein's 
notion of family resemblance we can derive a non-essentia l ist 
and plural istic view of cu ltura l  identity as something that is  
historica l ly situated, action-based, and value-laden. So the 
three crucial ingredients of my Wittgensteinian fami l ia l  view of 
cu ltura l  identity are historicity, agency, and normativity. On my 
view, cu ltura l  identity is produced and maintai ned by historical 
practices; secondly, it is crucial ly dependent on the agency of its 
members and also on the agency of those with whom they interact; 
and final ly, a cu ltural identity has a normative dimension, that 
is, membership  i n  the cu ltura l  group is i nformed by normative 
attitudes (attitudes that may be quite heterogeneous and often 
remain impl icit). I develop my Wittgensteinian fami l ia l  view of 
Hispanic identity i n  two stages. In  the first stage I offer a critical 
examination of Jorge G racia's fami l ia l  account. There I argue that 
Gracia's account is not Wittgensteinian enough and I criticize its 
metaphysical presuppositions from a Wittgensteinian perspective. 
In the second and more positive stage of my argument I develop 
my own polyphonic i nterpretation of the notion of fami ly 
resemblance and apply it to Hispanic identity. 
2a. Gracia's Familial View: History without Agency 
and Normativity. 
I n  Hispanic/Latina Identity Gracia (2000) argues that 
the col lective identity of Hispanics should be understood as 
the identity of a historical family formed by "a unique web of 
changing historical relations." (p. 49) On thi s  fami l ia l-historical 
view, the unity of Hispanics is  not a unity of commonality, but 
a unity of community, "a historical unity founded on relations." 
(p. 50) According to Gracia, the origi n of the complex history 
that unites "our Hispanic fami ly" i s  "the encounter" of Iberia 
and America i n  1 492. Gracia argues that the term "Hispanic" i s  
the only appropriate name for our historical fami ly because it 
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is the only label that can bring together all those Iberians and 
Americans who have come to share a cultural identity as a result 
of historical events. Rather than discussing the validity of these 
specific contentious claims, I want to discuss instead the general 
strengths and weaknesses of Gracia's familial view. 
The main strength of Gracia's familial-historical view is its 
capacity to account for change and diversity as fundamental 
aspects of Hispanic identity. On Gracia's view the cultural identity 
of a group is neither static nor homogeneous. On the one hand, 
Gracia's diachronic view depicts Hispanic identity as something 
dynamic that is always in the making and can never be fixed 
once and for all. This picture brings to the fore the contingencies 
of the past that have contributed to the formation of our Hispanic 
identity; and it underscores that the future of our Hispanic family 
remains open: "The future is always open and can be different. 
We are not trapped in our identity." (p. 190) On the other hand, 
Gracia's familial-historical view emphasizes the heterogeneous 
character of Hispanic identity: Hispanics share only "family 
resemblances" and their identity "is bound up with difference." 
(p. 33) Gracia's familial analysis shows that the homogeneity 
of group identity is a myth, for families are not homogeneous 
wholes composed of pure elements: "They include contradictory 
elements and involve mixing. Indeed, contradiction and mixing 
seems to be of the essence, for a living unity is impossible without 
contradiction and heterogeneity." (p.SO) This is particularly true of 
our Hispanic family that has been constituted through mixing or 
mestizaje at all levels. 
Despite its unquestionable virtues, Gracia's familial-historical 
view has also some weaknesses. A critical look at the externalist 
and realist view of history that animates Gracia's account of 
Hispanic identity can help to uncover some of its problematic 
assumptions. In the first place, it is highly questionable that 
what gives unity to our Hispanic family is history per se and not 
the appropriation of that history in and through our practices. 
However, Gracia's externalist view of history forces him to this 
implausible conclusion: "What ties [a group of people] together, 
and separates them from others, is history and the particular events 
of that history rather than the consciousness of that history." (p. 
49) But it is far from clear that having a distinctive history is a 
sufficient condition for collective identity. This externalist claim 
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belies the fundamental practical dimension of cultural identity, 
which involves agency and is not something that simply happens 
to us as a result of history.ll1e explicit recognition of this practical 
aspect of Hispanic identity is essential for the self-empowerment 
of the group. 
In the second place, Gracia's familial-historical view shares 
with essentialist views the ambition of finding a metaphysical 
grounding for Hispanic identity that is independent of politiGll 
viewpoints. However, it seems implausible that history can 
provide such value-free grounding. Gracia insists that our 
philosophical justifications of claims about Hispanic identity 
"should not be based on politics, but on historical fact." (p. 67) 
But unless a strong fac..llvalue distinction is invoked, it is not at 
all clear that history and politics can be kept separate. Gracia 
seems to be reacting against accounts that have explicitly tied 
Hispanic/Latina identity to particular social and political agendas 
such as li!Jeration.6 Although Gracia acknowledges the crucial 
importance of the project of liberation in Latin America, he does 
not think that liberation should be considered as a constitutive 
element of Hispanicity, for the idea of liberation has not played 
the same key role everywhere in the Hispanic world and it is not 
clear that it will in the future.ll1is is indeed true, but it should not 
be a problem for a philosophical account of Hispanic identity 
that is developed for our here and now rather than for all times 
and all places. And this brings us to the unWittgenstenian aspect 
of Gracia's view. just as the traditional essentialist views, Gracia's 
familial-historical view purports to be .1 universal theory of Hispanic 
identity that is independent of specific contexts. By contrast, 
Wittgenstein encouraged us to look at specific cases for specific 
purposes. On Wittgenstein's view, the job of the philosopher 
is to arrange descriptions or "perspicuous representations" (PI 
§122), that is, to provide elucidations by situating things in their 
historical, practical, and normative contexts. And it is of the 
utmost importance that these descriptions or elucidations are 
produced for "particular practical purposes" (PI § 132). However, 
the philosophical standpoint adopted and encouraged by Gracia's 
view is not the situated perspective of an engaged critic, but the 
detached perspective of an observer who looks at the history of 
our Hispanic family sub specie aetemitatis. ll1is lack of sensitivity 
to practical and normative contexts is damaging, for it undermines 
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the critica l and transformative potential that a phi losophical  
e lucidation of Hispanic identity should have. 
In my opinion, Gracia's fami l ia l-h istorical view of Hispanic 
identity is an important step in the right di rection, but a step 
that cou ld have taken us much further if it had acknowledged 
the practica l and normative dimensions of identity. An adequate 
famil ial  account of identity needs to pay c loser attention to the 
role of agency and va lues in the formation of identity. Gracia's 
view ca l ls attention to one of the three crucial features of cu ltural 
identity-i .e. historicity, but disregards the other two-i .e. agency 
and normativity. However, these features cannot be separated 
without di stortion. As I wi l l  argue in what fo l lows, the hi storicity of 
a cultural group or family is essentia l ly practica l and nonnative. 
2b. Polyphonic Families: Families with Histories, 
Practices, and Norms. 
One of the lessons we can learn from Wittgenstein's later 
phi losophy is that most of the concepts we use to descri be 
ourselves and the world around us are not applied according to 
fixed criteria of strict identity. When we use a concept such as 
"game" or "chair", we treat al l  ki nds of different thi ngs as the 
same although they are not strictly identica l in  any respect. That 
is, in our categori zations different thi ngs are treated as i nstances 
of the same category even though there is no feature (or set of 
features) that they a l l  have in common: many different ki nds of 
activities are cal led games and many different ki nds of artifacts 
are cal led chai rs; and we can always add new items to the l ist of 
things that fa l l  under these concepts (we can a lways invent new 
ki nds of games and produce new ki nds of chairs). Wittgenstei n 
suggested that these concepts are l ike families, whose members 
resemble one another i n  many different ways: some may have 
simi lar hai r, others a simi lar nose, others may share a particu lar 
way of talki ng, or a simi lar laughter, etc. Fami lies are composed 
of heterogeneous elements. There is  noth ing in  particu lar that a l l  
their members must have: they si mply exhibit some s imi larities; 
they share certai n "fami ly resemblances", but there is no fixed 
set of necessary and sufficient conditions that determi ne fami l ia l  
membership. As Wittgestei n  puts it, what bri ngs together and 
keeps together the members of those categories that function l ike 
fami l ies is "a complicated network of simi larities overlappi ng 
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and criss-crossi ng." (PI §66) Wittgestei n's analogy between the 
strength of a concept and the strength of a thread i l lustrates this 
poi nt: "we extend our concept [ . . .  ] as in spi nning a thread we 
twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside 
in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but 
in the overlappi ng of many fibres." (PI §67) 
As I have argued elsewhere/ the fami l ial  identity of the 
members of a group is crucially dependent on overlappi ng 
s imi larities, but it is also doubly dependent on intersecting 
differences: differences with members of other groups that are 
considered prominent, and differences among the members of 
the group that are considered negl igible. In other words, the 
network of s imi larities i n  which fami l ial  identity consists must be 
accompanied by two distinct networks of overlapping and criss­
crossing differences: one network of differences that sets apart 
the members of the fami ly from the members of other fami lies; 
and another network composed of those differences among the 
members of the fami ly  themselves that lurk in the background 
and are disregarded for the sake of fami l ia l  identity. It is  important 
to note that the relationship that holds between these networks is 
a dynamic one: differences that today set apart one fami ly from 
another may become inconsequentia l  tomorrow; and, on the 
other hand, i nternal differences that are considered negligible 
today may grow to be important differences tomorrow, even to the 
point of excluding i ndividuals from membership in the fami ly. At 
the same ti me, these dynamic fluctuations between the networks 
of differences correspond to transformations in  the network of 
s imi larities that sustains fami lia l  identity, for a l l  these networks 
are mutua l ly dependent and they are shaped simultaneously. 
A fami ly is a l iving unit whose members come and go; and, 
therefore, a fami l ia l  identity i s  always subject to change and must 
be left open. Moreover, even when the membership  in  the fami ly  
remains the same, the relations among the members of the fami ly 
(as wel l as thei r relations with other fami l ies) change as differences 
become visible and fami ly ties are relaxed. It is important to note 
that these networks of simi larities and differences that become 
i ndicative of fami l ia l  identity have a history: they result from 
the conti nued use of certai n  associations, that i s, from treati ng 
things in a particular way in our practices. These networks of 
simi larities and differences acqui re diagnostic va lue simply 
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because of the (criteria!) significance they have been given i n  our 
practices, because they have come to be seen as symptoms of 
membership in a group. But those simi larities and differences-as 
wel l as their diagnostic value for cu ltural affi l iation-are always 
open to contestation (even if they do not face chal lenges and 
criticisms here and now); and claims about which simi larities and 
di fferences can be said to be constitutive of the cu ltura l  identity 
of a group are always defeasible (even if not yet defeated). In my 
view, the networks of simi larities and differences that have become 
symptomatic of fami l ial identity ca l l  for a genealogical account, 
that is, a genealogy of thei r formation through the shared ways of 
speaking and acting enforced by cu ltura l  practices (typical ly the 
dominant or mainstream practices with in  the cu lture). 
This fami l ial view of identity based on Wittgenstein's 
account of categorization makes clear that the homogeneity and 
fix ity of cultura l  identities are nothing but myths. Identity shou ld 
be thought of as something heterogeneous and fluid. Given the 
flu id heterogeneity of fami l ia l  identity, it is not surpri sing that al l  
attempts to reduce the shared identity of Hispanics to common 
properties fai I. These fai lures have led many to conclude that we 
should give up Hispanic identity and retreat to national  i dentities 
(Mexican identity, Cuban identity, Argentinean i dentity, etc.). But, 
as it turns out, these col lective identities pose the same problems 
(there is no fixed set of features shared by a l l  Mexi cans, a l l  Cubans, 
a l l  Argenti neans, etc). The lesson to learn here is that we shou ld 
reject the essential ist assumption that a shared identity must be 
based on common features. The unity of Hispanics cannot be 
established at the expense of diversity, but on the basis of it. As 
Gracia puts it, the un ity of Hispanics is "a unity in diversity" (p.  49); 
that is, it i s  not a u nity of commona l ity, but a unity of community: 
the unity of a family.8 This is a polyphonic unity: fami l ies are 
intri nsica l ly polyphonic because they contain a multip l icity of 
voices, standpoints, and perspectives. And the polyphony of a 
fami ly is essentia l ly dynamic: it i s  a living polyphony that cannot 
be ful ly control led or tamed; in particu lar, it cannot be forced 
to conform to an exhaustive cata logue of admissible fami l i al 
voices and perspectives, for what these are cannot be decided 
i n  advance, prior to the contingent historical development of the 
fami ly. 
My fami l ial-historica l view ca l ls attention to the contingencies 
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of the past that have contributed to the formation of our Hispanic 
identity; and it underscores that the future of our identity 
remains open and therefore presents us with a task for which we 
have to take responsibility. According to this view, identifying 
oneself as Hispanic (or as a member of any other group) is the 
expression of a commitment: a commitment to one's history, to a 
set of ongoing practices, and to a com mon future. Wh at is most 
distinctive about cultural identity is that it involves normative 
attitudes that inform one's interests, values, and practices. What 
characterizes membership in a cultural group is a relation of 
normative identification, which is precisely what the metaphor 
of the fa mily captures so well. Being part of a culture involves 
being committed to it; that is, it involves seeing oneself as part of 
that community or fa mily, no matter how different its members 
are and how heterogeneous their practices and values can be. 
TI1is is a formal commitment with no specific or fixed content. 
TI1ere is no list of values that we are asked to sign on to in order 
to become a member of the Hispanic fa mily. But the formal 
commitment that is involved in the normative identification with 
a group creates a bond with the members of the group. TI1is bond, 
which brings together the members of the group as a collectivity, 
is established and maintained th rough the commitment to a 
shared and coordinated agency that faces common problems and 
a common future-a commitment that is not affected by the fact 
that the members of the group will inevitably disagree about what 
their problems a re and what their future should look like. TI1e 
specific contents that our fa milial commitments happen to take 
will be determined historically th rough the collective agency and 
ongoing negotiations of the members of the group . 
As G racia saw, history produces cultural communities or 
families. But history is not something that simply happens to us . 
We make history (and remake it or reconstruct it). Of course this 
does not mean that we make it up.9 We don't simply invent history, 
but we construct it th rough our agency, individual and collective, 
conscious and unconscious . TI1e crucial point here is that to 
be a member of a cultural group or family is to be committed 
to pa rticipate in the collective agency of the group and in the 
endless process of negotiation in which their values and interests 
get articulated and discussed. These ongoing negotiations involve 
a double dialogue: a dialogue among the members of the group 
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and a dialogue of the group (and its members) with other groups 
(and their members) . To these complex polyphonic dialogues I 
now turn. 
3. Tongues Untied: Polyphonic Dialogues and the 
Cultural Agency of Hispanics In Particular Contexts 
The formation of a cultural identity requires an intra-cultural 
dialogue of an open plurality of voices (as many as possible). 
Through this dialogue the members of a culture can produce a 
multi-vocal articulation of their multiple problems, needs, values, 
ideals, and illusions. But this dialogue needs to be supplemented 
with another one that goes beyond the members of the group. For, 
indeed, no group-no matter how powerful or hegemonic-can 
fully comprehend the problems it faces and fully determine its 
own future independently of other groups. So an inter-cultural 
dialogue between the cultural group in question and other groups 
with which its existence is entangled is also necessary. 
We need to keep cultural dialogues as open as possible, 
without constraining and disciplining their constitutive diversity, 
that is, the plurality and heterogeneity of their voices. In other 
words, we need to keep our dialogues polyphonic. We have to be 
prepared to fight homogenizing tendencies that erase differences 
as well as normalizing tendencies that make certain articulations 
of identity mainstream and relegate other identity formations 
to the margins. We must resist the vain and dangerous attempt 
to tame the indomitable polyphony of intra- and inter-cultural 
dialogues. Coercive social and cultural forces and institutions 
(from school to the family and the media) are responsible for the 
homogenization of mainstream identities and the marginalization 
of those identities that don't conform to social expectations and 
established social norms. These coercive forces-which can come 
from inside one's own group or community as well as from other 
social units-limit the self-expression of individuals and groups as 
they navigate through intra-cultural and inter-cultural dialogues. 
They often restrict, handicap, and even preclude the emergence 
and development of alternative identities that can be subversive 
and transformative, for they weave the networks of similarities 
and differences that support relations of identification in new 
and alternative ways. A crucial part of this social and cultural 
process of disciplining identities and taming their polyphony 
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is the attempt to subdue and domesticate new languages and 
dialects that people develop to express thei r experiences, ideals, 
values, needs, i nterests, etc. These new li nguistic formations (new 
language-games) can faci litate the rearticu lation or reconstruction 
of established groups or fami l ies and the creation of new ones. 
Therefore, keeping cu ltural dialogues open and guaranteei ng the 
flourishing of polyphonic identities requi res resisti ng the taming 
of one's tongue. 
Of specia l  i nterest in this respect are the frontier identities and 
border languages that trouble cu ltura l  dialogues by underscoring 
their i ndomitable diversity and the complex dialectic between 
i ntra-fami l ia l  and i nter-fami l ial  relations. These are the languages 
and identities of those who live at the l imits or borders between 
communities-en /a frontera-and often have multiple fami l ia l  
affi l iations, belongi ng to different cu ltura l  groups or fami l ies 
simultaneously. 1° Frontier identities and border languages have 
recently received special attention in  the l iterature, especial ly i n  
the pioneer work of G loria Anzaldua. In  Borderlands! La Frontera 
Anzaldua tel ls us that at the core of her Chicana identity is a 
cu ltura l  duplicity that makes her a stranger even to the members 
of her own fami ly, let alone to those of other fami l ies, to whom 
she appears as fu l ly foreign and even deviant. Those who have 
frontier identities often display signs of cu ltura l  otherness in  their 
faces and bodies, in their manners and comportment, and in  their 
speech.lhese are signs that often come under attack, bei ng subject 
to the domesticating social and cu ltural forces that conspire to 
erase them. Our bodies and habits are disci pl i ned; our tongues 
are tamed. In this respect, Anzaldua talks about the concerted 
efforts "to get rid of our accents", which she describes as a violent 
attack on one's identity and basic rights: "Attacks on one's form 
of expression with the intent to censor are a violation of the Fi rst 
Amendment. El Anglo con cara de inocente nos arranc6/a lengua. 
Wi ld tongues can't be tamed, they can on ly be cut out." (p. 76) 
It is  important to note that the efforts to tame one's tongue 
do not come only from outside one's group or fami ly. Anzaldua 
poignantly remarks that her Chicana tongue is not only tamed 
-and ultimately "cut out"-by the Anglos, but a lso by other 
Hispanics. Chicano Spanish is  not recognized and respected 
by many other Spanish speakers: "Even our own people, other 
Spanish speakers, nos quieren poner candados en Ia boca. [ . . .  ] 
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Chicano Spanish is considered by the purist and by �ost Latinos 
deficient, a muti lation of Spanish ." (pp. 76-77) And th1s scorn and 
discip l in ing efforts come not j ust from other Spanish s�eakers,. but from Chicanas and Chi canos themselves, who have mternahzed 
the al leged inferiority of their language and, u ltimately, of their 
identity. "Chicanas who grew up speaking Chicano Spanish have 
i nternal ized the bel ief that we speak poor Spanish [ . . .  ] we use our 
language differences against each other." (p. 80) Thus Chicanos 
are left speaking "an orphan tongue": 
Deslenguadas. Somos las del espaiiol deficiente. We 
are your l i nguistic nightmare, your l i nguistic aberration, 
your li nguistic mestisaje, the subject of your bur/a. Be­
cause we speak with tongues of fire we are cultura l ly 
crucified. Racial ly, cultural ly, and l inguistica l ly somos 
huerfanos-we speak an orphan tongue. (Anza ldua 
1999, p. 80) 
The domestication of a border language such as Chicano 
Spanish leaves its speakers tongue-tied, speech less, i ndeed as if 
their tongues had been cut out, for they are rendered unable to 
express themselves in their own ways . The social stigmatization 
and cu ltural orphanage of their forms of expression amount to the 
margi nal ization of their very identities:11 " I f  a person, Chi cana or 
Lati na, has a low estimation of my native tongue, she has also a 
low estimation of me. [ . . . ] I am my language. Unti l I can take pri de 
in  my language, I cannot take pride in  myself." (pp. 80-81) This 
moment of self-empowerment through one's tongue is a moment 
of cultural  pride and cu ltural affirmation. It invo lves a demand 
for cultural solidarity, for the formation of a proud l i nguistic 
community l i berated from self-hatred, a community in  which the 
marginalized tongue finds a home and a fami ly and is no longer 
orphan. Anzaldua makes this poi nt in very Wittgensteinian terms, 
cal l ing for the construction of a "We"--un 11Nosotras11-around 
a common tongue that corresponds to a shared form of l i fe. She 
writes: "Chicano Spanish is a border tongue which developed 
natural ly. [ . . .  ] Un language que corresponde a un modo de vi vir. 
Chicano Spanish i s  not incorrect, it is a l iv ing language. [ . . . ] for a 
people who cannot entirely identify with either standard (formal, 
Casti l l ian) Spanish nor standard Engl ish, what recourse is left to 
them but to create their own language? A language which they 
can connect their identity to, one capable of communicati ng the 
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real ities and values true to themselves." (p. 77) 
As Anza ldua suggests, a common tongue that can express 
people's "rea lities and values" makes possible the cu ltural 
process of community formation around a shared form of l ife. 
Through a common tongue people can articu late their shared 
experiences, prob lems, needs, i nterests, values, etc.; and thus 
cu ltura l  sol idarity becomes possible. For this reason, Chicano 
Spanish deserves recognition and respect from the members of the 
Hispanic fami ly as wel l  from other cu ltura l  groups. For this reason 
also, we ought to acknowledge the special cu ltural productivity of 
border tongues in general,  for they make possib le the articu lation 
of new experiences and new forms of identity, faci l itati ng the 
diversification of cu ltural norms and cu ltura l  expectations. The 
task of cu ltural self-affirmation through language is a complex 
and always ongoing task. It is extremely complex because it has 
to be constantly diversified, maki ng sure that no voices are left 
out.12 And it is also a never-ending task, for cu ltures and cu ltura l  
identities are living things that are a lways changing. 
Keeping tongues untied is a pressi ng task for which we are 
a l l  col lectively responsible, as individuals and as communities. 
But it is  i ndeed not an easy task. In and through cu ltural dialogues 
we need to secure recognition and respect for a l l  but especial ly 
for those who have been si lenced and may be left without a 
voice, those whose experiences depart from normalized cu ltural 
expectations, those whose identities do not fit into the established 
cu ltural molds avai I able to them. There are cu ltura l  identities that 
need a new language to express themselves and the creation of 
a supportive community in  which to flouri sh, identities that­
without special attention and care-are doomed to isolation and 
si lence because they wi l l  remain margi nalized and tongue-tied. 
Keeping tongues untied, keeping cu ltural dialogues polyphonic, 
i nvolves a process of constant interrogation and cha l lenge, a 
process of radical but immanent critique of our cu ltural practices 
and the ways in  which they i nclude and exclude people through 
the sedimentation of cu ltural s imi larities and differences. We need 
to destabi l ize whatever cu ltural borders or frontiers are erected, 
whatever relations of i nclusion and exclusion are establ ished in  
the cu ltural landscape. This  critical activity of interrogation and 
destabi l ization of cu ltura l  boundaries is  epitomized in the work of 
the Tij uana-based Chicano performance artist Gui l lermo Gomez-
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Pena. He aptly describes his performance art as "dangerous 
broder-crossing" (2000) and as an exercise in "the semiotics of 
the frontier" and "the epistemology of multiplicity" (2002). In 
his performances Gomez-Pena parodies the attitudes towards 
cultural differences that contribute to perpetuate oppression 
and marginalization. In his recent work (2002) he develops a 
performative critique of the objectivism of academic discourses 
that treat cultural differences as mere objects of study. He turns 
the tables on scientific observers, parodically mimicking their 
objetivizing gaze, when he acts as "un antropo/oco fronterizo" 
who crosses the borders in search for differences to add to the 
catalogue of exotic behavior. In his performative rendering of 
reverse anthropology, the "antropo/oco" Gomez-Pena captures 
specimens of gringos who are displayed in cages, as trophies of 
his cultural expedition, to an audience that is asked to form a 
We--a community-whose identity is defined in opposition to 
these cultural others. 
Gomez-Pena's parodic performances also contain a 
performative critique of the cultural exoticism that transforms 
cultural differences into products of consumption. This 
consumerist attitude toward differences is patent in cultural 
tourism. In their cultural explorations tourists make a spectacle 
of cultural differences ("the spectacularization of the bizarre"); 
and the more distant the cultural differences encountered, the 
bigger the thri II and the more reassured the tourists wi II feel about 
their own ways upon return from their trip. This cultural exoticism 
also trivializes otherness through the commodification of cultural 
differences that can be found in fashion and pop culture: "the 
young hipsters of the 90s have selectively borrowed elements 
from numerous third world 'pet cultures', to create their own 
designer tribalism." (2000, p. 272) This cultural consumerism 
results in the normalization of cultural differences and the creation 
of "alternative mainstreams". As Gomez-Pena puts it, the legacy 
of the 1990s is "that the insatiable and undifferentiated mass of 
the so-called 'mainstream' has finally devoured all margins, and 
the more dangerous, 'other', and exotic these margins, the better. 
In fact, stricto sensu, we can say that there are no margins left. 
'Alternative' thought, fringe subcultures, and so-called radical 
behavior have actually become THE mainstream." (Ibid.) 
Our challenge in the 21st century is to recognize and respect 
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cu ltura l  differences without exoticizing them or commodifyi ng 
them, without contributi ng to their marginalization or assimi lati ng 
them to the mainstream.  This cha l lenge ca l ls for the troubl ing of the 
relation between center and periphery, for the interrogation of the 
boundaries that separate cu ltural centers from cu ltural margi ns. 
Gomez-Pena's performances often involve a subversive violation 
of cu ltural expectations that invites the critica l questioning and 
problematization of cu ltura l  boundaries. But it is i mportant to note 
that we don't need physical  and geographical borders to engage 
i n  the transgression of cu ltural boundaries and socia l  norms. 
Cu ltura l  boundaries and the differences and exclusions they 
i nstitute exist even when there are no visible frontiers. And the 
critical i nterrogation of these boundaries shou ld not be left only 
to performance artists and "professionals" of cu ltura l  otherness 
such as Gomez-Pena. Al l  of us, i n  our own everyday activities 
and performances as cu ltural agents, shou ld contribute to the 
critical questioning, reconstruction, and rearticu lation of cu ltural 
boundaries. Creative and reconstructive "border-crossing" can 
take place within any given community and cu ltura l  landscape, 
even at what is considered the very core or center of the fami l ia l  
group i n  question and its "homeland" or native cultural space. This 
productive "border-crossing" can take place even if the physical 
and geographical  borders are not with in  sight, for i ndeed there 
are more frontiers than the visible ones-there are borders, very 
real  borders (even if they are not physical  and visible) whenever 
there are relations of i nclusion and exclusion. 
An example of cu ltura l  "border-crossi ng" that takes p lace 
far from (and i ndependently of) physical borders can be found 
in the unorthodox rel igious practices of margi nal ized groups i n  
the urban ghettos of Mexico City. These include the practices of 
worshipi ng Santa Muerte, a rel igious icon that " looks l ike hel l :  a 
scythe-wielding skeleton with a blood-curdl ing gri n" (as reported 
by The New York Ttmes, March 26, 2004, A4). This  vision of hel l  
attracts those who come from places that feel l ike hel l on  earth, 
inner-city neighborhoods such as Tepito, a cri me-ravaged slum i n  
the heart of Mexico City. Santa Muerte is  "an angel of last resort 
for outlaws and outcasts" ( Ibid.) .  Her fol lowers are people who 
l ive on the fringes of society, people who have been abandoned 
by thei r government and disparaged by thei r church: prostitutes, 
petty thieves, smugglers, drug dealers and addicts, and crimi nals 
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of al l  sorts, who have been excluded from mainstream culture 
and its practices, where their participation is deemed inadmissible 
because of the way they speak, the way they dress, their manners 
and habits, and indeed their lifesty le. They know they cannot go 
to La Virgen de Guadalupe dressed like that, speaking like that, 
living like that. And therefore they take their prayers and candle­
offerings elsewhere, to Santa Muerte. Her worshipers say that they 
adore Santa Muerte because she is their own creation and she is 
like them: she is depicted as enjoying chocolates and jewelry, 
cigarettes and whiskey. Santa Muerte has been created by the 
people in their own image. This is where Santa Muerte's strong 
popular appeal among Mexico's impoverished and neglected 
masses lies. This religious icon has been constructed and is used 
as a site of cultural identification that fil ls a void created by social 
and cu ltural exclusions. As Hayde Sol fs Cirdenas-a street vendor 
who sel ls smuggled sneakers in Tepito-is reported to have said, 
La Virgen de Guadalupe "wou ld not sympathize with a life like 
hers, tending rather to wel l -off people with col lege degrees and 
nice clothes", but Santa Muerte "hears prayers from dark places" 
since "she was sent to rescue the lost, society's rejects" (Ibid.) .  
The Catholic Church in Mexico has condemned Santa Muerte 
services as devi I worship, and law enforcement authorities keep 
a close eye on this cu lt, which they link to street violence and 
delinquency. But this tout court condemnation and persecution 
are problematic and social ly irresponsib le, for they simply ignore 
that these cu ltural practices fu lfil l a crucial social need for cu ltural 
affirmation and collective self-expression. And the rejection 
of new forms of cultural expression is especial ly worrisome 
when it is issued from privileged places of power, and when it 
targets the cu ltural agency and voices of people who have been 
left out of accepted practices and institutions. It is too bad that 
marginalized cu ltural practices such as those surrounding Santa 
Muerte are rejected off hand by the mainstream, although this 
is certainly not surprising, since the authorities and institutions 
of mainstream cu lture have something at stake here, namely, 
retaining their privileged and hegemonic status by maintaining 
the established boundaries between acceptable and inadmissible 
forms of  cultural expression. Of course, my claim is not that the 
unorthodox religious practices surrounding Santa Muerte wil l  
surely b e  the path t o  human f lourishing for the oppressed and 
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marginal ized groups that participate in  them. They may or may 
not be. But my point is s imply that we must al low for a lternative 
cu ltural practices l ike these to articulate people's experiences and 
to give cu ltura l  expression to thei r interests, va lues, aspirations, 
fears, goals, ideals, and i l lusions . 1 3  
My polyphonic view contends that our cu ltural practices 
should be open to a// possible voices. Now, it is important to 
note that thi s  notion of cu ltural openness welcomes all voices 
but not all forms of symbolic interactions. For, indeed, there are 
non-dialogical ways i n  which voices can i nteract with other 
voices so as to oppress them, to margi nal ize them, and even to 
si lence them or destroy them altogether. Polyphonic dialogues 
can only contribute to cu ltura l  openness if, without excluding 
any voice (or set of voices) i n  particu lar, they do everything 
they can to avoid symbolic impositions, marginalizations, and 
forms of si lenci ng (such as, for example, hate speech). It is  not 
at a l l  clear that the best way to avert these dangers of symbolic 
oppression i s  prohibition. In  thi s  sense, in  Excitable Speech ( 1 997) 
Judith Butler has argued quite convincingly that censorship is  
not the best way of deal ing with the symbol ic disempowerment 
and si lenci ng that resu It from hate speech; and there are indeed 
good reasons to bel ieve that speech codes that simply prohibit 
the use of certai n  terms are not particu larly effective in the 
fight agai nst symbolic oppression. Cu ltural openness is not 
secured by legal mandates and prohibitions. Securing cu ltura l  
openness must i nvolve arrangi ng our symbolic practices (and the 
discursive contexts in which they take place) i n  such a way that 
any attempt to disempower or si lence voices is discouraged and 
neutral ized, making it very difficult (perhaps even i mpossible) 
for such attempts to succeed. But it would be naive to thi nk that 
we can create discursive practices and spaces that el imi nate 
all possib le forms of exclusion and si lencing. It would also be 
wrong to assume that the task is  s imply to identify those voices 
that are exclusionary and antidemocratic (the si lenci ng voices 
of racists, sexists, homophobes, etc), because voices are plastic 
and dynamic:1 4  i nsofar as they are a l ive, they can change and are 
therefore moving targets that don't admit reification (they can be 
cooperative and i nclusive here and now, and yet antagonistic and 
exclusionary there and then).  
We need to al low for alternative cu ltural spaces and 
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alternative cu ltural practices. We have to make it possible for 
people to deve lop their own ways of expressi ng themselves and 
of articu lating thei r experiences, problems, i nterests, etc. We have 
the individual and col lective responsibi l ity to do everything we 
can to keep cu ltural dialogues open and to al low for the identities 
of groups and individuals to be polyphonic, that is, to contai n 
a (diverse and heterogeneous) plural ity of voices. We have to 
keep tongues untied. We have to make our cu ltural  dia logues 
polyphonic. Of course, open and polyphonic dia logues do not 
guarantee cultural so l idarity, social justice, the mitigation of 
oppression, and the flourishing of happier cu ltura l groups or 
famil ies. The achievement of these goa ls is never guaranteed. 
But what untying tongues and having polyphon ic dia logues 
can do is to increase the capacity that groups and i ndividuals 
have to negotiate their pasts, presents, and futures, freely, so that 
the conti ngent ach ievement of cu ltura l sol idarity, social  justice, 
l iberation, and happi ness can come to depend (at least to some 
degree) on their own agency. 
When tongues are untied, we do not know what they wi I I  
say, o r  even in  what language they wi I I  speak; but we know at 
least this: that they wi l l  be able to talk.  "I wi l l  have my voice [ . . .  ] .  
I wi l l  have my serpent's tongue-my woman's voice, my sexual 
voice, my poet's voice. I wi l l  overcome the tradition of si lence." 
(Anzaldua 1 999, p. 8 1 ) 
Notes 
1 See Bakhtin (1 981 ). 
2 I have done this in my (2004). For a ful ler d iscussion of th is i ssue as it 
emerges in the discussion of Hispanic/Lati na identity, see Alcoff (2000). 
3 For example, in Post-eth nic America Davi<l Hol l inger (2000) argues for 
the construction of an American identity without eth nic or racial mean­
ings. I have argued against the post-eth nic view at length in my (2004). 
See also Alcoff (2004). 
4 Arguments for the idea that cultural identity is always an<! necessarily 
bound up with internal d i fferences can be fou nc! in Benhabib (2002 ) 
and Narayan ( 1 997). Drawing on the writings of Jose Marti, I have also 
developed a heterogeneous and plural istic view of cultural identity 
through the notion of "unity through d iversity". See my (2004). 
1 8  
Medina-Tounges Untied 
5 For a fu l l  analysis and discussion of th is notion, see Munoz ( 1 999) and 
my (2 003). 
6 See, for example, Alcoff and Mendieta (2000) and Schutte (1 993). 
7 See Med ina (2003). 
8 1 n order to properly understand my famil ial account of identity, two ca­
veats are in order. First, in my view, the notion of a family should not be 
understood as a purely biological concept, but rather, as a hybrid notion 
that contains social and pol itical elements as well as biological ones. 
Famil ies are not just biological groups, but social structures and legal 
institutions. Secondly, we have to keep in mind that there are al l  kinds 
of family and, therefore, only a plural istic notion of "family" can be use­
ful for the analysis of col l ective identities. My Wittgensteinian approach 
does not rely on the patriarchal and heterosex ist famil ial moc!el that has 
been domi nant in the West. Far from being complacent with this  model , 
the genealogical approach behind my famil ial view is intended to sub­
vert it. In th is sense, my fami l ial view connects with ongoing efforts in 
the l iterature on identity (esp. in feminist theory anc! queer studies) to 
rearticul ate the very notion of a family anc! to subvert what is typical ly  
understood by "fami ly val ues". See my (2003). 
9 For a balanced discussion of the complex relations between the objec­
tive and the intersubjective aspects of history, see Alcoff (2004). 
1 0  As I have argued in my (2003), a l l  of us have multiple famil ial  identi­
ties, with intersecting family ties that are often in tension. As Gomez­
Peiia (2 000) puts it, "we are al l members of multiple communities, at 
d ifferent times and for different reasons. Most communities in the 90s 
are fragmented, ephemeral, dysfu nctional, and insufficient. They can 
only contain and 'i ncl ude' selected aspects of ourselves." (p. 2 77) 
1 1 This si lenci ng is certainly gencler-specific. As Anzaldua notes, in the 
case of Ch icanas, the si lencing of their ethnic voices converges with the 
si lencing of their female voices. In th is sense she describes how she was 
raised, as a woman, in a "tradition of si lence": "Ser habladora was to be 
a gossip and a l iar, to tal k  too much. [ . . .  ] Hocicona, repelona, chismosa 
[ . . . ] are al l signs of being mal criada. In my culture they are a l l  words 
that are derogatory if appl ied to women-J've never heard them appl ied 
to men." (p. 76) This double oppression and marginal ization as woman 
and Ch icana that Anzaldua describes reminds us that there are mu ltiple 
and convergi ng fronts of oppression. The phenomenon of mu ltiple op­
pression has been discussed and theorize<! by Lugones (2003). It is also 
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the topic of my (2003). 
12 As Anzaklua points out, "there is no one Ch ica no language just as 
there is no one Chicano experience." (p. 80) Even for a s ingle individual, 
taking pride in one's tongue is typical ly not a single, unified task, but a 
plural ity of tasks, with mu ltiple fronts, for we speak in many tongues: 
"because we are a complex, heterogeneous people, we speak many 
languages." (p. 77) 
1 3  In this respect some trends within l iberation theology have done very 
important work in ga in ing recogn ition and respect for the unorthodox 
religious practices of oppressed classes and marginal ized groups. See 
especially Althaus-Reid (2000). 
1 4  For a fu l l  discussion of the plasticity of voices and their agency, see 
chapters 3 and 4 of my new book (2006). Chapter 5 elaborates the 
claims I have made in th is paragraph through a critical examination of 
symbolic processes of silencing and excl usion. 
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